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THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
JOHN T. COPENHAVER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code is the product of some four
years of effort on the part of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. It is the design of this article to review
the purpose and the provisions of the Code generally and to consider
the effect its adoption would have on existing law and practices in
West Virginia.
The final draft of the Code' was adopted at the 1968 annual
meeting of the Commissioners and has since been approved by the
American Bar Association. Although the final draft is subject to style
changes that will conform the Code to the requirements and regula-
tions of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System pur-
suant to the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act,2 it is antici-
pated that all such changes will be of a relatively minor nature.' On
the other hand, whether the Code will meet a sufficient measure of
resistance in the various state legislatures so as to bring about changes
* Referee in Bankruptcy, United States District Court, Southern District
of West Virginia. A.B., West Virginia University, 1947; J.D., West Virginia,
1950.
' UNORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE (Final Draft) hereinafter cited as
UCCC. All references and citations are to the final draft as adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 30,
1968, as revised in November, 1968.
2 Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 1 et seq., - Stat. -. The
Consumer Credit Protection Act embraces the Truth in Lending Act dealing
with disclosure, advertising and rescission by the debtor of certain transactions
creating a lien on his residence. It also limits wage garnishment and provides
criminal penalties with respect to extortionate credit transactions.
3 Such changes may not seem quite so minor to those sellers and lenders
who find unduly burdensome the cost and inefficiency of compliance with cer-
tain of the disclosure requirements of proposed Regulation Z of the Federal
Reserve Board (12 C.F.R. § 226) under the Federal Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act. Presumably, reasonable adjustments will be made to allow for special
problems without weakening the disclosure principle. Finalization of the Code
and the regulation of the Federal Reserve Board is expected in January, 1969.
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of a more substantial kind, as was the case in the early years of the
Uniform Commercial Code, remains to be seen.'
The Code would replace existing general and special interest rate
statutes and retail installment sales acts with a single legislative en-
actment. A general rate ceiling of 18 percent per year would apply,
with higher rates permissible for the smaller transactions ranging
as high as $6,000.' These higher rates on both sales and loans
would run to 36 percent per year on the first $300, 21 percent per
year on the next $700, and 15 percent per year on the excess over
$1,000; however, sales under revolving charge accounts would be
limited to 2 percent per month on the first $500 and 1-1/2 percent
per month on the excess over $500.
The Code ceilings are premised on the theory that rate maximums
must be high enough to permit the flow of goods and money on
credit to the broadest feasible segment of consumers and yet with
some limits imposed in order to protect the necessitous or unsophisti-
cated consumer who is in no position to bargain with the seller or
the lender. Even so, the seemingly generous rates authorized under
the Code are not entirely out of line with the maximum yields now
permitted to certain classes of creditors in West Virginia, as is later
noted in some detail.
Having established liberal rate ceilings, the Code provides the
climate for the settling of actual rates at levels lower than the ceil-
ings by encouraging competition both through free entry into the
lending arena and through disclosure of the true annual rate of the
credit service charge on sales and the loan finance charge on loans.
Disclosure, of course, is required under the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act, effective July 1, 1969. However, the federal act
provides that the Federal Reserve Board may exempt any class of
credit transactions which it finds to be subject under state law to re-
quirements substantially similar to those imposed under the federal
act and for which there is adequate provision for enforcement. The
provisions of the Code are designed to meet this standard. Through
disclosure, it is to be hoped that the consuming public will in time
become aware of the significance of rate charges to the end that shop-
ping for the best credit terms will tend to become as common as shop-
ping for the most favorable commodity price. At the same time, com-
petition is to be fostered under the Code through the process of free
4 Denonn, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code Bombshell, 22 PERSONAL
FiN.cn L.Q. REP. 125 (1968).
5 See note 38, infra.
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lender entry into the loan field, thereby doing away with the segment-
ed and rigidly structured system into which the general and special
interest rate statutes now cast the various types of lenders. As a re-
sult, the banks will be enabled by adequate rates to enter the small
loan field, the small loan companies will be given access to the entire
loan field, and the sales finance companies and even the sellers them-
selves will be permitted to go beyond the financing of sales of auto-
mobiles and other goods by making consumer cash loans.
Although free entry is basic to the Code concept, it can be an-
ticipated that opposition to this key provision will come from cer-
tain lenders who are now favored with special legislation under which
they enjoy a degree of monopoly to charge at high rate levels. For ex-
ample, under existing law6 a small loan company cannot operate
under the Small Loans Act until it has first obtained a license from
the banking commissioner. In determining whether a license will be
granted, the banking commissioner applies the convenience and
advantage test under which he sifts all the circumstances of the
proposed operation, its location, the needs of the community and the
effect on other financial institutions in the area.7 The Code discards
this test. Instead, anyone desiring to enter the lending field may
make loans carrying rates up to 18 percent per year without a
license. Those wishing to make supervised loans (carrying rates
over 18 percent) must apply for a license' from the Administrator, a
position which would likely be filled by the banking commissioner."
Licenses will be easy to obtain under the character and fitness
standard adopted by the Code. Under this test, the Administrator
need only find that the financial responsibility, character and fitness
of the applicant, its members or officers, are such as to warrant the
belief that the business will be operated honestly and fairly. ' But
all licensees will be subject to close supervision." Supervised
financial organizations, such as banks and industrial loan companies,
will not need a license inasmuch as they will continue to be super-
vised' 2 by the same state or national official or agency to whose
supervision the organization is already subject. 3 All others, whether
making supervised loans or not, will be subject to investigatory
powers exercised by the Administrator.'
4
6 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 7A, § 1 (Michie 1966).
7 Id. § 4.
8 UCCC § 3.503.
9 UCCC § 6.103.
10 UCCC § 3.503 (2).
1 UCCC 9H 3.505, 3.506.
12 UCCC § 3.502.
13 UCCC § 3.506, 6.105.
14 UCCC §§ 3.506, 6.106.
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The Code also contains a number of provisions designed to pro-
tect the consumer from practices regarded as either inherently abusive
or as having formed the basis for substantial abuse in the past. It
curtails certain collection remedies deemed unduly harsh and it lim-
its a number of other creditor practices which have led to immodera-
tion and overreaching. Concomitantly, the Code grants the debtor a
three-day right to rescind certain transactions which create a lien on
his home or which he has made with door-to-door salesmen. It also
confers upon him the right to recover excessive charges and, in certain
instances, penalties for violations of the Code. In addition to private
enforcement by the debtor, the Code endows the Administrator with
rather broad authority to conduct investigations, issue cease and de-
sist orders and bring court actions to enforce such of his orders as
have become final. He may also seek injunctive relief and recover
on behalf of debtors or classes of debtors. ' 5
H. USURY AND REALITY
Although the principle of free competition without price control
has been the hallmark of our economy with respect to the sale of
goods and services,'" statutes have long served to control the price of
money in the consumer field. The history of usury statutes is a
story frequently related in connection with the Code. 7 In biblical
and medieval times, interest in any amount was a violation of religious
law. In this country usury statutes generally served until this century
to fix the maximum interest rate for the loan of money at or near 6
percent per year simple interest. However, in response to the social
and economic necessity of establishing realistic rates in order to per-
mit and encourage the extension of credit and the loan of money to
the consumer, the general usury statutes of the states have been rid-
dled with both legislative and judicial exceptions sanctioning increas-
ed rates for transactions falling in virtually every category. Never-
theless, the 6 percent myth continues today, 8 largely for the reason
that so many of the special statutes are couched in terms of 6 per-
cent, whereas the method under which the 6 percent calculation can
15 For an excellent article on the Code, see Jordan and Warren, The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387 (1968).
16 Exceptions include price control in times of emergency and charges
made by utility monopolies.
17 Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 819 (1968).
18 Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23
Bus. lAw. 931 (1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445 (1968).
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be made is often such as to furnish yields up to several times the
stated rate.
Because the seller frequently found that he could not, without loss,
sell his goods on time at a 6 percent rate, the first major exception
came by judicial fiat in the form of the time-price doctrine.19 Under
this doctrine, it was held that the usury statute was limited to the
loan of money, thereby freeing the seller to make his sale on any
terms he chose. The time-price principle effectively removed con-
sumer credit sales from the inhibition of the general usury statutes
and cleared the way prior to the turn of the twentieth century for
the beginning of a consumer credit economy. With the proliferation
of corresponding legislative exceptions in the lending field, relief from
the stifling effect of a 6 percent rate inadequate to attract legitimate
capital to meet the needs of the consumer has largely been realized.2"
The Uniform Small Loan Act, developed by the Russell Sage Foun-
dation in 1916 after thorough study of the small loan business, con-
stituted one of the early exceptions in the lending field. Originally
establishing rates as high as 42 percent on loans up to $300, the
Small Loan Acts served to attract investment funds into a high risk
consumer area where loan sharks had long flourished by extracting
exorbitant charges from the necessitous and the ignorant. At about
the same time came the Morris Plan banks and industrial loan com-
panies which, in effect, were authorized to loan at a 6 percent rate,
calculated on and discounted from the original principal balance for
the whole term of the loan without regard to the fact that the loan
was repayable in equal monthly installments. The 6 percent dis-
count rate under the Morris Plan served to produce true annual in-
terest ranging from nearly 12 percent on a one year loan to 15 percent
on a five year loan. Subsequently, similar installment loan excep-
tions were extended to commercial banks. Credit unions have like-
wise been authorized high level rates, varying from 1 percent to
1-1/2 percent per month for a true annual interest rate of 12 per-
cent to 18 percent. Numerous other exceptions have been granted
to other lending institutions in the various states. In effect, these ex-
ceptions simply constitute recognition of the hard fact that loan money
is not available and will not be made available unless the investor
19 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U. S. (1 Black) 115 (1861); Reger v. O'Neal, 33
W. Va. 159, 10 S.E. 375 (1889).
20 Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Cre-
dit, 66 MICH. L. Rnv. 81 (1967); Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine
-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 819 (1968).
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is adequately compensated for the use of his money and reimbursed
for the substantial costs which he incurs in procuring, making, set-
ting up and collecting his loans, together with an adequate reserve to
meet bad debt losses.2"
Most consumer indebtedness, though not always classified as such,
falls in the category of residence real estate mortgage debt." The
interest rate on home mortgages is controlled not by the usury sta-
tute but by the realities of the marketplace." A substantial measure
of the first mortgage loan business in West Virginia was subject
to a 6 percent rate until increased to 8 percent by the legislature in
September 1968.4 For many years prior to the increase, first mort-
gage money was loaned at rates below the 6 percent level by virtue
of the prevailing conditions of the money market. As the market rate
rose to 6 percent and then beyond, investors subject to the 6 percent
limitation simply withdrew their funds from West Virginia until
the legislature acted to revise upward the lawful rate. These same
competitive forces, not the rate statutes, likewise govern the return
realized in the financing of the sale of new automobiles and, to a
substantial degree, other consumer goods.2 5
A somewhat different set of circumstances influences the rate at
which money is lent by the small loan companies and industrial loan
companies. Here, the borrowers fall in a high risk class, the secur-
ity is seldom adequate and the rates are generally geared to the
maximum interest allowed by law. By employing maximum rates,
those engaged in lending at this economic level serve a broader seg-
21 Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Headache,
19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 819 (1968).
22 As of December 31, 1967, consumer indebtedness in the United States
was composed of the following:
Residence Mortgage Debt
(I to 4 family dwellings) --------- 229.0 Billion
Consumer Installment Debt
Automobile paper -...................................---- 31.2
Other consumer goods paper ------------- 21.3
Repair and modernization paper __3.7
Personal loans ---. 7 77.9 Billion
Consumer Non-Installment Debt 21.3 Billion
328.2 Billion
FINANCE FACTS 1968 YEARBOOK, 37, 42 (1968).
23 Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 819, 858 (1968).
24 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie 1966), as amended, W. Va.
Legislature, 1968 Extraordinary Session (Sept. 14, 1968).
25 Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Cre-
dit, 66 MICH. L. REv. 81, 91-92 (1967).
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ment of consumers than would be possible if they were to classify
their debtors by degree of risk and allot rates accordingly. In es-
sence, their better accounts are helping to pay the way for marginal
debtors for whom credit would not otherwise be available. It is to
be hoped that the competitive forces set free under the Code would
bring about more discrimination in the rates charged to such debtors
so as to scale them more nearly in accordance with the degree of risk
involved. The extent to which this will occur is problematical indeed.
In any case, as is developed below, the maximum rates under the Code
are, in many respects, no greater than those which lenders serving
high risk clientele are already authorized to charge under West Vir-
ginia law.
Existing rates, like the Code rates, take into account the various
factors which necessitate adoption of high rate levels. For example,
investment funds obtained by small loan companies and industrial
loan companies are generally borrowed from banks at the prime rate,
currently running in the range of 6 percent. Additionally, the smaller
companies must pay a further premium in the form either of a di-
rect charge or a requirement that the borrowing company not draw
upon a so-called compensating balance. Thus, the cost of such bor-
rowed money may run well in excess of the prime rate, dependent up-
on the interplay of all those factors which determine in a given in-
stance the rate at which funds will be lent.
In addition to the cost of his money, the small loan or industrial
loan operator must also recoup the general expense of his business
operation, including the cost of making a given loan, setting it up
on his books and collecting the account. These fixed costs per loan
are frequently as great for a $500 loan as for a $5,000 loan, thereby
necessitating a higher rate of return on the smaller loans. In this
connection, a recent study of major national consumer finance com-
panies discloses their average annual operating expenses, excluding
cost of money and bad debt reserve, to be $10.47 per $100 of ave-
rage loan balance.26 Moreover, bad debt losses on small loans and
industrial loans are substantially greater than those incurred on the
lower risk, better-secured loans handled by the banks. Only after
all of these fixed costs have been absorbed does the return to the
lender commence to produce a profit. Unless the authorized rates
26 J. CHAPmAN & R. SH&Y, TBE CONSUMER FINANCE INDusTRY 38 (1967).
See also Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment
Credit, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 81, 110-11 (1967); Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest
Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23 Bus. LAw. 931, 934-38 (1968).
1968]
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are great enough to justify investors to enter the higher risk field,
legitimate capital is simply not available. Instead, loan sharks will
inevitably rush into the vacuum at rates far in excess of those at which
the small loan and industrial loan companies now operate.
III. RATE CEILINGS
In the place of "interest," the Code substitutes the terms "credit
service charge""7 with respect to sales and "loan finance charge"2
with respect to loans. They constitute the charges which are subject
to rate ceilings and which must be disclosed to the debtor in the form
of the true annual rate. The credit service and loan finance charges
are given essentially the same meaning. Both embrace not only time-
price differential, service charges, carrying charges, interest,
points, discount and similar charges, but also credit investigation
charges, broker fees and all other charges imposed as an incident to
the extension of credit. This means that premiums for credit life
insurance and credit accident and health insurance must be treated
as part of the credit service or loan finance charge where the seller
or lender requires the debtor to furnish such insurance as a condition
of making the credit sale or loan; but if the debtor, after being noti-
fied in writing that he need not purchase such insurance, elects never-
theless to do so, the premium may be treated as an "additional
charge"29 permitted over and above and excluded from the credit
service or loan finance charge. On the other hand, the debtor can
be required to furnish property casualty insurance and the premium
for this will be treated as an additional charge if written notice is
given to the debtor that he may purchase such insurance elsewhere.2
Other additional charges unaffected by the rate limits of the Code
include official fees and taxes, annual charges for certain lender credit
cards and reasonable closing costs in connection with real estate trans-
actions where the credit service or loan finance charge does not other-
wise exceed 10 percent per year."
A. Consumer Credit Sales
Although consumer credit sales have not been subjected to rate
limitations in West Virginia, 2 the Code would impose rate ceilings on
27 UCCC § 2.109.
28 UCCC § 3.109.
29 UCCC §§ 2.202, 3.202.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Reger v. O'Neal, 33 W. Va. 159 10 S.E. 375 (1889).
[Vol. 71
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nearly all such sales. A consumer credit sale33 is defined as the sale
of goods or services where the amount financed does not exceed
$25,000 and the sale of an interest in land regardless of amount,
whereunder a professional creditor sells to an individual (as disting-
uished from a partnership or corporation) for a personal, family,
household or agricultural purpose, provided that the debt is either
payable in four or more installments or a credit service charge is
made.34
The credit service charge is established at a general maximum
rate of 18 percent per year,35 with two exceptions. Revolving charge
accounts may carry a rate of 2 percent per month on the first $500
and 1-1/2 percent per month on the excess over $500, with a mini-
mum charge of $.50 per month.36 All other consumer credit sales
may take place under rate ceilings as follows: 36 percent per year on
the first $300, 21 percent per year on the next $700, and 15 percent
per year on all sums in excess of $1,000, with a minimum charge of
$5 on sales up to $75 and a minimum charge of $7.50 on sales over
$75." It is noted that the charge under the latter formula subsides
near to an overall rate of 18 percent per year when the balance is
in the range of $3,500 to $6,000." 8 Accordingly, on credit transac-
33 All such consumer credit sales are subject not only to the rate limits im-
posed by the Code but also to the provisions on disclosure, debtor remedies,
limitation of creditor rights and administrative enforcement. However, real
estate transactions at rates not exceeding 10% per year are subject only to
disclosure and debtor remedies. UCCC § 2.104 (2) (b).
34 If the debt is payable in four or more installments, credit jewelers and
credit clothing merchants who do not separately state a credit service charge
are nevertheless covered by other disclosure requirements as well as provisions
of the Code relating to debtor remedies, limitation of creditor rights and ad-
ministrative enforcement. But where no credit service charge is made and the
debt is payable in less than four installments, the transaction is not covered by
any of the Code's provisions; thus, excluded from the Code is the typical 30-
day retail charge account as well as the usual single-payment arrangement
generally contemplated for satisfaction of fees of professional men and many
others who render services to the consumer.
3- UCCC § 2.201 (2) (b).
36 UCCC § 2.207 (3).
37 UCCC § 2.201 (2), (6).
3 However, the composite rate on a $3,500 transaction repayable in equal
monthly installments would be substantially greater than 18% because the
rate increases as the reducing balance moves into the higher rate levels which
prevail on the lower balances. For example, a one-year installment sale or loan
of $3,500 principal, with interest calculated at the Code's graduated rates, would
be repayable in 12 equal monthly installments of $324.21 each, resulting in a
true annual rate of 20%. Correspondingly, a $6,000 debt, repayable at the
Code's graduated rates in 12 equal monthly installments of $550.12 each,
results in a true annual composite rate of 18%. Actually, consumer loans of
this size would more likely be repayable over a longer period of three years in
smaller installments, in which case the true annual rates would be slightly less.
1968]
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tions in excess of $6,000, a creditor seeking the highest permissible
rate would utilize the flat 18 percent charge.
B. Consumer Loans
In place of the various interest rate maximums now established
under many different West Virginia statutes for various types of
lenders, the Code would provide a general 18 percent rate ceiling
for consumer loans, " with supervised loans carrying the same 36
percent - 21 percent - 15 percent ratios just noted in connection
with consumer credit sales.4" Like the consumer credit sale, a con-
summer loan is defined as a loan of money where either the princi-
pal does not exceed $25,000 or the debt is secured by an interest in
land regardless of amount, made by a professional lender to an indi-
vidual (as distinguished from a partnership or corporation) for a
personal, family, household or agricultural purpose, provided that
the debt is either payable in two or more installments or a loan fi-
nance charge is made.4
Effective September 14, 1968, the current general simple inter-
est rate maximum in West Virginia was increased from 6 percent
to 8 percent per year.42 The 8 percent simple interest rate, like
the 6 percent rate before it, governs loans made by individuals and
loans made by firms not accorded higher rates under the various spe-
cial statutes. 3 However, the bulk of consumer lending in West Vir-
-9 UCCC § 3.201 (1). The 18% limit is applicable to non-regulated loans
(carrying rates up to 10% per year) and regulated loans (carrying rates over
10%). A $.50 minimum monthly charge is permitted on revolving loan ac-
counts bearing not more than the 18% rate, UCCC § 3.201 (4) (c). Other-
wise, no minimum charge is permitted on loans of any kind except on prepay-
ment, refinancing or consolidation, in which case the minimum is $5 on a
principal loan of $75 and $7.50 on a principal loan in excess of $75 but in no
event more than the total finance charge originally agreed upon.
40 UCCC § 3.508. Supervised loans would cover loans of principal up
to $3,500 and somewhat beyond, as observed at note 38, supra.
41 UCCC § 3.104.
42 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie 1966), as amended, W. Va.
Legislature, 1968 Extraordinary Session (Sept. 14, 1968).
43 The interest rate remains at 6% for lenders licensed under the secon-
dary mortgage statute relating to residence real estate, with all additional
charges for title fees, credit investigation fees, brokerage, discount and the like
limited to 10% of the principal sum loaned. W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 17, § 8
(Michie Supp. 1968). Banks, industrial loan companies, credit unions and
other lenders duly licensed or chartered under other statutory provisions are
expressly exempt from the limitations imposed by the secondary mortgage
statute, W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 17, § 2 (Michie Supp. 1968).
[Vol. 71
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ginia is controlled by special interest rate statutes permitting yields
well in excess of the general 8 percent maximum.
Lenders now favored in West Virginia with high rate ceilings in-
dlude West Virginia chartered credit unions at 1-1/2 percent per
month, being 18 percent per year simple interest.44 Building and
loan associations may charge such premium in excess of the general
8 percent rate as may be fixed by their by-laws4" and approved by the
banking commissioner." Small loan companies are governed by rates
comparable to those sanctioned by the Code up to $800, calculated
as follows: 36 percent on the first $200, 24 percent on the next $400,
and 18 percent on the next $200, with all over $800 being set at
6 percent per year simple interest." Like the general interest ceil-
ing of 8 percent per year, each of the foregoing is based on simple
annual interest calculated according to the actuarial method.4" So,
too, are the rate maximums authorized under the Code.49 By simple
interest is meant true annual interest. It is the rate which one or-
dinarily has in mind when speaking of interest.
Higher rates are also available for installment loans by commercial
banks"0 and industrial savings and loan companies.5 Inasmuch as
consumer loans of all types are generally repayable on an installment
basis, the higher rates govern. These rates are expressed in terms
equivalent to 6 percent discount for banks and 8 percent discount
for industrial loan companies.52 Rates expressed as a percentage dis-
count in fact carry a true annual rate much greater than the stated
44 W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 10, § 16 (Michie 1966). Federal credit un-
ions may loan at 1% per month, being 12% per year simple interest, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1757(5) (1967).
41 W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 6 § 17 (Michie 1966).46 W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 6, § 7 (Michie 1966). See also W. VA. CODE
ch. 31, art. 6, § 41 and ch. 31, art, 8, § 20(c) (Michie 1966).
41 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 7A, § 13 (Michie 1966).
48 UCCC § 1.301 (1). The actuarial method is the process of allocating
payments made on a debt between principal and the credit charge, pursuant
to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated credit charge and
the balance is applied to the unpaid principal.
49 Id.
5o W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art 4, § 20. See also W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art.
8, § 20(c) (Michie 1966).
-5 W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art 7, § 6(e). See also W. VA. CODE cl. 31, art.
8, § 20(c) (Michie 1966).
52 The 1968 amendment to W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 5 (Michie
Supp. 1968), raising the general interest rate from 6% to 8%, specifies that a
"banking institution" entitled to 6% discount on installment loans under W. VA.
CODE ch. 31, art. 4, § 20 (Michie 1966), remains limited to the 6% discount
rate on such loans. However, an industrial loan company is not a banking in-
stitution, Community Savings & Loan Co. v. James, 121 W. Va. 5, 1 S.E.2d 617
(1939); nor is it governed by W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 4, § 20 (Michie 1966).
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figure. This is due to two factors. First, the amount of the interest
is calculated as though the original loan were outstanding for the en-
tire term of the loan, whereas the loan is ordinarily repayable in
equal monthly installments that serve to decrease the unpaid balance
each month. This feature nearly doubles the effective rate of in-
terest.5 Secondly, the interest so calculated is deducted from the
face amount of the loan so that the borrower does not actually re-
ceive the full sum on which the interest calculation was made. This,
too, serves to increase the effective rate of interest. Moreover, as the
term of the loan lengthens, the amount of interest deducted from the
face of the loan increases while the sum actually placed in the hands
of the borrower subsides accordingly. This further augments the rate
of return, as the accompanying chart indicates.54 Thus, the effective
annual simple interest rate for banks on installment loans at 6 per-
cent discount is 11.58 percent for a one year loan, rising to 13.4 per-
cent for a three year loan and 15 percent for a five year loan. 5
The installment loan rate of 8 percent discount permitted to indus-
trial loan companies runs considerably higher, as the chart indicates.5"
Also, the industrial loan companies are authorized to make a flat
charge of 2 percent of the face amount of each loan for expenses in-
curred in making the loan, such as investigation of the character and
circumstances of the debtor and the preparation of loan papers and
the like."7 In essence, this charge constitutes additional interest and,
under the Code, would be treated as a part of the loan finance
11 This refers to discount rates ranging from 6% to 10% on loans repay-
able in equal monthly installments over a one year period. Rates on such loans
in excess of 10% discount are more than double the stated rate. See the chart
at note 54, infra.
54 CONVERSION TO TRUE ANNUAL INTEREST OF RATES
STATED AS PERCENTAGE DISCOUNT ON LOANS REPAYABLE
IN EQUAL MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS OVER 1, 2, and 3 YEAR TERMS
Percentage TRUE ANNUAL INTEREST RATE
Discount Rate I yr. term 2 yr. term 3 yr. term
6% 11.6% 12.6% 13.4%
7 13.6 14.9 16.0
8 15.7 17.3 18.8
9 17.8 19.8 21.8
10 19.9 22.4 24.8
11 22.1 25.1 28.2
12 24.3 27.9 31.8
55 By way of contrast, where the interest is added instead of discounted,
the yield on loans of one year or longer remains virtually constant despite in-
creased length of maturity. For an installment loan carrying a 6% add-on
rate, the true annual interest will remain at about 10.9% regardless of the
number of years over which such a loan may extend. Of course, under the
actuarial method, the charge is neither added nor deducted-and the rate
remains exactly as stated.
56 Supra note 54.
57 W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 7, § 6(f) (Michie 1966).
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charge.58 By allocating the 2 percent charge over the number of
years of the loan and adding it to the 8 percent discount rate, the
actual discount rate becomes 10 percent for a one year loan, 9 per-
cent for a two year loan, 8.67 percent for a three year loan and so on.
This, in turn, produces true annual interest, as indicated by the chart,
of 19.9 percent for a one year loan, 19.8 percent for a two year loan
and 20.8 for a three year loan.59 In addition, the true yield goes sub-
stantially higher through tie-in sales of insurance. As will be later de-
veloped, the insurance factor can readily raise the true annual yield
for industrial loan companies to 21.6 percent for a one year loan,
21.8 percent for a two year loan and 23.1 percent for a three year
loan."°
So, it is seen, once the mystique is removed, that the rates pro-
posed under the Code are, in many instances, no greater than those
now authorized in West Virginia.
C. Consumer Related Sales and Loans
The terms "consumer related sale"' and "consumer related loan"'62
cover a substantial number of transactions which do not fall within the
definition of a consumer credit sale or loan. This coverage establishes
an 18 percent per year ceiling on the credit service or loan finance
charge for all such consumer related sales or loans,63 except that sales
under revolving charge accounts are governed by a 2 percent per
month rate on the first $500 and 1-1/2 percent per month on the
excess over $500.64
Consumer related sales and loans are those involving a sale or loan
of any kind where the amount financed or loaned does not exceed
$25,000, if the buyer is an individual or if the debt is secured primar-
ily by a security interest in a one or two family dwelling occupied by
a person closely related to the debtor, such as a member of the fam-
ily or an officer or controlling stockholder of a debtor corporation."
This means that the 18 percent rate applies generally to all such sales
or loans by a seller or lender who is not otherwise covered because
he does not regularly engage in similar credit transactions. It also
58 UCCC § 3.109. See also UCCC § 2.109.
59 Supra note 54.
60 See text at notes 70 to 79, inf ra.
61 UCCC § 2.602 (1).
62 UCCC § 3.602 (1).
63 UCCC §§ 2.602 (2), 3.602 (2).
64 UCCC § 2.602 (3).
65 UCCC §§ 2.602 (1), 3.602 (1).
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applies to credit sales or loans to individuals for a business purpose,
such as the sale of inventory or the loan of money to the self-em-
ployed grocer. It likewise covers the situation in which the controlling
stockholder of a small corporation is required to use his home as
security for a business loan. In essence, the parties protected are
those who are apt to be as much in need of protection as any con-
sumer. But if the amount financed or loaned exceeds $25,000, they
are presumed to be capable of fending for themselves.
On the other hand, sales or loans to a corporation, other than one
involving a residence mortgage in the instance above noted, are
not covered by interest rate or other Code limitations. Thus, the
Code simply continues the existing statutory policy of exempting cor-
porations from the defense of usury66 and extends it to other busi-
ness organizations as well. The theory, of course, is that such or-
ganizations are able to protect their own interests.
IV. INSURANCE
As already indicated, yields on loans may go substantially be-
yond usury limitations through tie-in sales of insurance. It is cus-
tomary for industrial loan companies in West Virginia to require the
borrower to incur a premium for credit life insurance that will pay
off the unpaid balance in the event of the borrower's death. Many in-
dustrial loan companies also require the borrower to purchase a
credit accident and health insurance policy that is designed to cover
loan payments falling due during the period of the borrower's disa-
bility. These insurance premiums, to be sure, are not interest.
Nevertheless, the increased yield derived by the lender is here the
equivalent of interest. The premiums charged for such insurance are
generally far greater than would be required if the lender were in-
terested in effecting a group plan with an insurance company afford-
ing protection at the lowest competitive cost. Instead, however, of
seeking the lowest cost, the lender seeks out the highest cost insurance
in order that he might obtain the excessive portion of the premium
in the form of substantial sales commissions and rebates. Thus, the
excess goes not to the insurer but to the lender. This practice is well
known to the insurance industry as reverse competition. 7
66 W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1966).
67 For an excellent analysis of credit insurance practices, see Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1967), statement of James H. Hunt, Fel-
low, Society of Actuaries, Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, State of
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For example, the credit life insurance premium which the debtor
must pay in connection with industrial loans is now frequently set
at $1 per $100 per year of decreasing term insurance; decreasing, that
is, in accordance with the unpaid balance of the loan. In other words,
the actual cost comes to $20 per $1,000 of outstanding insurance
per year. This can be compared with an annual charge of approxi-
mately $7 per $1000 for which a mutual insurance company fur-
nishes credit life to credit union borrowers throughout the United
States and for which the credit unions make no separate charge to the
debtor. In alternate terms, the $1 per $100 per year of decreasing
term can be compared to the charge of $.37-1/2 per $100 per year
which a life insurance company charges a large corporation for credit
life coverage on its sales financing paper. 8 It can likewise be com-
pared to the sum of $.50 per $100 which major banks in the Kana-
wha Valley area charge to their debtors in those instances where a
separate charge for credit life is made. Commissions and credits to
lenders selling credit life insurance at the $1 rate easily reach $.50
or more for each $100 of loan per year of decreasing term.69
As this is written, the state insurance commissioner has just pro-
mulgated a proposed regulation under which the prima facie maxi-
mum rate for credit life insurance would be fixed, beginning in 1969,
at $.75 per $100 per year." Under the $.75 rate, the yield to the
lender can be estimated at some $.25 or more for each $100 of loan
per year."' This would furnish an effective yield of about 1/4 percent
for each year of the loan, discounted in advance.
Vt., at 57-68; and statement of W. Harold Bittel, Fellow, Society of Actuaries,
Chief Actuary, N. J. Department of Banking and Insurance, at 72-76. As
noted in the statement of James H. Hunt at page 58, credit life insurance cov-
ers an estimated 85% of all consumer installment debt, excluding charge ac-
counts, credit cards and residential mortgage debt; and credit health insurance,
covering only about 10% of consumer installment debt, is rapidly growing
in popularity with creditors.
68 Hearings Before the Sub. Comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1239-41 (1967).
69 Loss benefits payable on credit life insurance over the nation average
about $.30 per $100 per year. See statement of W. Harold Bittle, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72, 74 (1967).
70 W. Va. Administrative Regulations, Insurance Commissioner, Reg. 6-9,
§ 6.01, promulgated Sept. 27, 1968.
71 Indicative of the gain realized by the lender at the $.75 rate, are the
prima facie maximum credit life rates established in Vermont at $.44; Dis-
trict of Columbia at $.49; Connecticut, Massachusetts and Nevada at $.50;
Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Washington at $.60; and New York and
New Jersey where the rate ranges from $.44 to $.64, dependent upon case size.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, exhibit 4, table 3, at 14-15.
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The same proposed regulation deals with credit accident and health
insurance.72 Although no prima facie maximum rate is set, the pro-
posed regulation would require the filing with the insurance com-
missioner of the policy form and the premium rate to be charged, to-
gether with actuarial justification for such rate. Inasmuch as the
insurance commissioner is empowered by statute to disapprove a pol-
icy where the benefits are unreasonable in relation to the premium
charged, 3 it is to be hoped that some measure of rate control will be
exercised. However, a former regulation of the state insurance com-
missioner, containing a similar requirement of filing and rate justi-
fication,74 has not precluded industrial loan companies from charging
the borrower with credit accident and health rates up to $5 per $100
of loan for a three year term.7 Even in those states setting prima
facie maximum credit accident and health rates and establishing
specific dollar limits on the cost of such coverage, the rates are sub-
stantial, running generally in the range of $2.20 for a one year term,
$3.00 for a two year term and $3.80 for a three year term. 6 On the
average, premiums at this level run about double the cost of credit life
insurance and double, too, are the commissions to the lender, coming
to an estimated average of about 1/2 percent per $100 per year.
By combining the credit life 1/4 percent yield with the credit
accident and health 1/2 percent yield, the lender would derive com-
missions and credits agregating approximately 3/4 percent per $100
per year, discounted in advance . 7 Thus, these additional yields from
insurance sales commissions and credits would equal 3/4 percent for
a one year loan, 1-1/2 percent for a two year loan, 2-1/4 percent
for a three year loan and so on. Consequently, when the total yield
to the industrial loan company is calculated by adding the authorized
8 percent annual rate, the allocable portion of the 2 percent service
charge and the commissions and credits of 3/4 percent per year on
72 W. Va. Administrative Regulations, Insurance Commissioner, Reg. 6-9,
§ 6.05, promulgated Sept. 27, 1968.
73 W. VA. CoD ch. 33, art. 6, § 9(e) (Michie 1966).
74 W. Va. Administrative Regulations, Insurance Commissioner, Reg.
59CLCA&S, § VII, promulgated July 15, 1959.
7- A review of creditor claims filed by industrial loan companies in
bankruptcy court cases in the Southern District of West Virginia indicates that
the $5 per $100 rate is a popular one, although a number of such creditors
handle lower cost policies.
76 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, exhibit 5, table
4, at 16-19.
77 This, of course, is substantially less than the gain which many indus-
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credit life and credit accident and health insurance-all discounted
in advance-the true annual rate comes to 21.6 percent for one year,
21.8 percent for two years, and 23.1 percent for three years.78 Of
course, as the term of the loan increases, the simple annual interest
rate per year continues to rise at an accelerating rate, climbing
here to 27.2 percent per year for a five year term. Moreover, absent
adequate regulation and enforcement, the even higher yields that
could be realized by industrial loan companies through tie-in sales
of yet other forms of insurance would seem to be limited only by the
imagination of the lender and, on occasion, the legal principle of un-
conscionability.79
The Code's Article on insurance' is somewhat more specific than
existing West Virginia statutory law in granting regulatory authority
to the Insurance Commissioner with respect to credit-connected in-
surance. Nevertheless, the Code itself will do little to curtail the
hidden gains realized by sellers or lenders who choose to exploit the
opportunities available to them through tie-in sales of insurance. Of
course, the Code does compel one who requires his debtor to pur-
chase credit life and accident and health insurance to include the
entire cost as a part of his credit service or loan finance charge."
This means that both interest and insurance premium combined can-
not exceed the rate ceiling. It likewise means that the seller or lender
must disclose his rate accordingly. Yet, it is naive to suppose that the
necessitous or unsophisticated borrower cannot easily be persuaded
in the lender's office to purchase such insurance "voluntarily" as an
"additional charge" despite its high cost and dubious worth to the
debtor. 2
78 See text at notes 50 to 60, supra, and chart at note 54, supra.
79 See In re Holley, Debtor (Ref. S. D. W. Va. 1968) involving the claim
of an industrial loan company on a 36-month installment note in the original
face amount of $3,420. From the loan proceeds, charges were deducted not
only for credit life insurance at $1 per $100 per year on decreasing term
($102.60) and for credit accident and health insurance at $5 per $100 for the
three-year term ($171.00), but also for a high cost fire, inland marine, extended
coverage and theft policy, insuring the debtor's household goods for three years
against such impending perils as shipwreck, train derailment and bridge col-
lapse. Although the policy purported to cover actual cash value up to $3,420,
the household goods had an original cost of only $1,100. Three-fourths of the
$153.90 premium for the household goods policy was ordered stricken from
the claim.
80 UCCC §§ 4.101-4.304.
81 See text at notes 27 to 29, supra.
82 Low cost credit life insurance which pays off the bank's balance on a
new car purchase ordinarily leaves the debtor's estate with a valuable asset.
But high cost credit life which pays off the industrial loan company's balance
on a loan secured merely by used household goods ordinarily leaves the
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It seems that the preferable answer to reverse competition
lies in strict regulation designed to achieve rates at equitable levels
that prohibit lender profiteering. The step now being taken by the
State Insurance Commissioner to regulate this area is helpful, but
it is only a beginning. The premium rates for credit insurance ought
to be reduced to the point that commissions to the seller or lender
are minimal, particularly in view of the generous rate ceilings under
the Code. It can, indeed, be argued that merely obtaining the bene-
fit of credit insurance protection ought to be commission enough
to the creditor. In any case, whether the Code be adopted or not,
it appears that it is time for the legislature to concern itself with
the adverse effect on the borrower of reverse competition in the
credit insurance field.
V. DISCLOSURE
The central provision of Title 1 of the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act, popularly known as the Truth in Lending Act, re-
quires the creditor to state to the debtor the credit charge in terms
of the true annual percentage rate. 3 Title 1, effective July 1, 1969,
authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to exempt from federal
disclosure requirements any class of transactions within any state
if the Board determines that under the law of that state such trans-
actions are subject to requirements substantially similar to those
federally imposed, including the Board's regulations thereunder, and
that there is adequate provision for enforcement. 4 In the main, the
disclosure requirements of the Code are already well in line with the
similar requirements under the federal act. At this writing, efforts
are being made to reconcile the provisions of the Code and the preli-
minary regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board.85 This goal
will doubtless be achieved.
A. Disclosure in Sales and Loans
Under the Code the required disclosure must be made clearly and
conspicuously, in writing, with delivery of a copy to the debtor or, if
debtor's estate with nothing but a motley assortment of furnishings having
little value. Inasmuch as the lender in the latter situation would frequently
have no financially responsible source from which to make the loan good, it
is plain enough that the real worth of credit life in such cases is to the lender,
not the debtor's "estate." Correspondingly, the value to the debtor in relation
to the debtor in relation to the high premiums exacted for many accident
and health policies which overprotect the debtor with unnecessarily extensive
coverage is seldom apparent.
83 Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 1 et seq.,-Stat.-.
84 Id. at § 123.
85 Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Proposed Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (Oct. 16, 1968).
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more than one, to at least one of the debtors." The disclosure must
be given before credit is extended, but this requirement is satisfied if
disclosure is set forth conspicuously in the sale, lease or loan agree-
ment itself.8" An exception, however, for sales made by mail or
telephone without personal solicitation permits disclosure to be
made in the seller's catalog or other printed material distributed
to the public, provided that before the first payment is due the seller
furnishes the information otherwise required. 8 A similar exception
applies to loans made by mail or telephone without personal solicita-
tion.89 Neither exception applies to sales or loans under revolving
accounts.9"
1. Installment Sales and Loans Other Than Revolving Credit.9 -
Whereas the lender must give the borrower a statement of the amount
paid to or for his account, the seller must give the buyer a statement
containing (1) a description of the property sold, (2) the cash price
of the property or services sold and (3) the down payment, including
the net allowance for trade-in and a statement of the amount of any
lien which the seller agrees to discharge. In addition, the statement
of seller and lender alike must contain the following information:
(a) amount and description of registration, title or license fees and
official fees and taxes; (b) type and amount of insurance coverage
and the amount of any separate charge therefor; (c) amount and
description of other additional charges; (d) the principal or amount
financed, being the net total of the foregoing; (e) the amount of the
credit service or loan finance charge (but this need not be disclosed
in the case of the sale of a dwelling or a loan secured by a first lien
purchase money security interest on a dwelling, where such charge
does not exceed 10 percent per year - as a result, the large sums
of interest payable over the life of most first lien home mortgages
need not be stated); (f) the amount of the unpaid balance, being the
principal or amount financed plus the credit service or loan finance
charge; (g) the true annual rate of the credit service or loan finance
charge (but the rate need not be disclosed if the charge is $5 or less
86 UCCC §§ 2.302, 3.302.
87 Id. Written acknowledgement of receipt by the debtor to whom a
statement is required to be given creates a presumption that it was so given.
88 UCCC § 2.305. The buyer is given 15 days after receipt of the re-
quired information in which to prepay the account without incurring a credit
service charge.
89 UCCC § 3.305. See also §§ 3.306 (3), 3.310.
90 UCCC §§ 2.305, 3.305.
91 UCCC §§ 2.306, 3.306.
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and the principal or amount financed does not exceed $75 or if the
charge is $7.50 or less on amounts exceeding $75); (h) a schedule
of payments and late charges; and (i) description of any security in-
terest held in respect to the extension of credit.
2. Revolving Credit Sales and Loans.92-Inasmuch as revolving
credit arrangements contemplate a continuing fluctuation in the
amount that will be outstanding from time to time, with the date of
future purchases or loans thereunder being unknown at the outset,
it is not feasible to apply the same rigid disclosure requirements
governing a single sale or loan. Instead, the revolving charge account
creditor is required to state the guidelines of their arrangement, by
furnishing the buyer or borrower with the following information: (1)
the conditions under which a credit service charge or loan finance
charge may be made, including the time period for repayment without
incurring such charge; (2) the method of determining the balance
upon which the credit charge is to be computed; (3) the method of
determining the amount of the credit service charge, including the
monthly percentage (e.g., 1-1/2 percent) used to calculate the same;
(4) the corresponding nominal annual percentage rate (e.g., 1-1/2
percent times 12; hence, 18 percent; (5) conditions under which
additional charges for insurance and the like may be made; and (6)
conditions under which the seller may hold a security interest in
property securing the unpaid balance. In addition, the creditor is
required to furnish the buyer or debtor with detailed information
following the end of each billing cycle, setting forth a complete state-
ment of the account at the beginning, during and end of each such
period, together with a statement of the amount of the credit service
or loan finance charge, the periodic percentage or percentages used
to calculate the charge, the balance or balances on which such charge
was so computed and the manner in which such balance was deter-
mined.
B. Disclosure in Other Situations
1. Consumer Leases.93 -The lessor must give to the lessee a state-
ment containing a description of the goods, the amount paid or pay-
able for official fees or taxes, the type and amount of insurance to be
paid by the lessor, and a schedule of the date and amount of each
periodic payment and the amount of any other charges, together with
the total amount payable by the lessee. The lessor must also give to
92 UCCC §§ 2.310, 3.310.
93 UCCC § 2.311.
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the lessee a statement of the conditions under which the lessee may
terminate the lease prior to the end of the term and the liabilities
which the lease imposes upon the lessee at the end of the term. Of
course, the disclosure requirements are satisfied by simply setting out
the required information conspicuously in the lease, sale or loan
agreement itself.94
2. Advertising.-In advertising the rate of a credit service or loan
finance charge, the Code requires the advertising creditor to state
the rate in terms of true annual percentage."5 If the creditor states
either the dollar amount of the charge or the dollar amount of the
installment payments, he must also state the true annual rate of the
charge and the number and amount of the installment payments.
So, no longer will the seller be permitted merely to advertise that
a given appliance "is yours for only $18 per month." He must also
state how many $18 installments are required and he must state
the true annual percentage rate of the credit service charge.
VI. LIMITATIONS ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS
A number of limitations on creditors' rights and remedies have
been provided in the Code in order to curtail certain practices in the
consumer field regarded as either inherently abusive or as having
formed the basis for substantial abuse in the past. Many of these
restrictions are embodied in consumer protection legislation already
in effect in various states. Virtually all of them, however, would be
new to West Virginia.
A. Provisions Affecting Consumer Credit Sales, Leases and Loans
1. Generally.-Multiple agreements may not be used by a seller
or lender for the purpose of obtaining a higher credit service or loan
finance charge than would otherwise be permitted, or to avoid dis-
closure of an annual percentage rate.96 Wage assignments are unen-
forceable. 97 Authorizations given to confess judgment on behalf of the
buyer, lessee or borrower are void.98
2. Security.-A seller may take a security interest in the property
sold. In the case of goods, however, the debt secured must be at
least $300, and in the case of services performed upon land or goods
94 UCCC §§ 2.302 (2), 3.302 (2).
95 UCCC §§ 2.313, 3.312.
96 UCCC §§ 2.402, 3.409, 3.509.
97 UCCC §§ 2.410, 3.403.
98 UCCC §§ 2.415, 3.407.
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installed or annexed thereto, the debt must be at least $1000."" A
lessor is prohibited from taking a security interest in any property of
the lessee to secure the debt arising from the lease. ' A lender under
a supervised loan (carrying rates over 18 percent) may not take a
security interest in land where the principal is $1,000 or less. ' It
is also noted that a creditor may not make a separate charge for
casualty insurance where the property insured has a value less than
$300 or where the principal or amount financed is less than $300. '02
3. Balloon payments.-If any scheduled payment is more than
twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled payments, the buyer
or borrower has the right to refinance the amount of that payment
at the time it is due, without penalty, on terms no less favorable than
the terms of the original agreement.' 3 A lessee's final payment may
not exceed twice the average payment allocable to a monthly period
under the lease."0 4
4. Attorney's fees.-Alternative provisions are furnished with
respect to agreements calling for payment by the buyer, lessee or
borrower of his creditor's attorney fees. Under the first alternative,
such a provision is prohibited and unenforceable.'0  Under the
second alternative, attorneys' fees are limited to 15 percent of the
unpaid debt after default and referral to an attorney who is not a
salaried employee of the creditor.' 6 If the second alternative is
adopted, attorney fees are nevertheless prohibited on supervised
loans in which the principal is $1,000 or less. 107
5. Limitation on garnishment.-The maximum part of an in-
dividual's disposable earnings (meaning earnings after deduction for
taxes required to be withheld) subject to garnishment may not exceed
the lesser of (1) 25 percent of such disposable earnings or (2) forty
times the federal minimum hourly wage then in effect (currently
being forty hours per week times $1.60, aggregating $64.00 week-
ly). ' This limitation, however, is confined to garnishment to
enforce payment of a judgment arising from a consumer credit sale,
99 UCCC § 2.407 (1).
'oo UCCC § 2.407 (2).
,o, UCCC § 3.510.
102 UCCC § 4.301 (3).
103 UCCC §§ 2.405, 3.402.
104 UCCC § 2.406.
105 UCCC §§ 2.413, 3.404 (Alternative A).
106 UCCC §§ 2.413, 3.404 (Alternative B).
107 UCCC § 3.514.
108 UCCC § 5.105.
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lease or loan.' °9 The Code provision is similar to that of the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act which limits garnishment, effective
July 1, 1970, to the lesser of (1) 25 percent of disposable earnings
or (2) thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage in effect at
the time the earnings are payable (currently being $48.00 week-
ly);'' but the federal act applies to garnishment for any purpose,
whereas the Code provision is limited to consumer indebtedness.
Fortunately, the federal act empowers the Secretary of Labor to
exempt garnishments issued under the laws of any state if he deter-
mines that the laws of that state provide restrictions on garnishment
which are substantially similar to those federally imposed."' As-
suming that the Code provisions will warrant such an exemption, the
employer is still left with the problem of determining whether a
given judgment arises from a consumer credit sale, consumer lease
or consumer loan as those terms are defined by the Code. Thus, the
employer would be called upon to satisfy himself as to the very
details of the underlying transaction, such as whether the original
debt was payable in less than four installments without a credit
service charge." 2 The employer ought to be relieved of the expense
and the potential liability which such a burden would impose. To this
end, it would seem preferable to amend the state wage garnishment
statute" 3 in such a way as to continue the existing West Virginia
wage garnishment limitation at 20 percent (calculated, however, on
net disposable earnings after tax withholdings rather than on gross
earnings as at present) regardless of the character of the underlying
debt, but exempting in any event forty times the federal minimum
hourly wage, now aggregating $64 weekly.
It is also to be observed that, under the Code exemption, the
employer would frequently be required to withhold and pay over
trivial sums on wage garnishment of lower income employees. For
example, an employee earning a gross of $80 per week, less income
tax and Social Security withholdings of $10, would realize disposable
earnings of $70 weekly. After allowing for the Code's current $64
flat exemption, the sum of $6 would be payable under the garnish-
ment. The cost to the employer and the collecting court of handling
such a small sum would surely exceed the amount of the garnishment
109 UCCC § 5.105 (2).
110 Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 303(a), - Stat.-.
' Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321 § 305, - Stat. -.
1,2 UCCC H§ 2.104, 3.104.
"13 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 5A, § 3 and art. 5B, § 3 (Michie 1966).
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payment and would hardly serve to do more than create friction be-
tween employer and employee. Accordingly, it is suggested that a
further exemption be granted to the debtor in any instance where the
garnishment would not produce at least $10 out of his earnings for
a given pay period.
6. No discharge from employment for garnishment.-Employers
are prohibited from discharging an employee by reason of garnish-
ment proceedings with respect to a judgment arising from a consumer
credit sale, consumer lease or consumer loan."" This provision is
an extension of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act which
provides that an employee shall not be discharged by the employer
for a single garnishment." 5 Again, however, it would seem that this
prohibition ought to be broadened so as to apply to all garnishment
proceedings regardless of the character of the underlying indebted-
ness. The Code further provides that an employee wrongfully dis-
charged hereunder may recover lost wages up to six weeks and may
obtain an order requiring reinstatement." 6
7. Unconscionability.-The Code adopts the unconscionability
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code relating to sales" 7 and
extends it to consumer leases and loans as well." 8
B. Provisions Affecting Consumer Credit Sales and Leases Only
1. Certain negotiable instruments prohibited.-Under a consumer
credit sale or lease, other than one primarily for an agricultural pur-
pose, the seller may not take a negotiable promissory note; but if he
does, a holder in due course is nevertheless protected." 9 It is the
view of the Code's draftsmen that professional financiers buying
consumer paper, being well aware of the enactment of the Code,
will normally not qualify as holders in due course with respect to
notes taken by dealers in violation of this provision and negotiated
to them. It is, however, possible that in unusual cases, second or
third holders may not know of the instrument's consumer origin, in
which case the Code upholds the policy favoring negotiability in
order not to cast a cloud over negotiable instruments generally.
2. When assignee subject to defenses.-Allied with the prohibi-
tion on use of negotiable notes are the Code's alternative provisions
114 UCCC § 5.106.
115 Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 304, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., (May 29, 1968).
116 UCCC § 5.202 (6).
117 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 302 (Michie 1966).
118 UCCC § 5.108.
119 UCCC § 2.403.
[Vol. 71
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss1/2
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
which would either void or limit an agreement by the buyer or lessee
to waive, as against the assignee of a seller or lessor, claims or de-
fenses arising out of a sale or lease. In the past, such agreements
have often served as the basis for substantial abuse in consumer
transactions in which a defrauded buyer is nevertheless required to
pay the seller's assignee in full. Here, the Code's draftsmen have
left it to the various state legislatures to decide which of two ap-
proaches is to be taken. The first alternative is advocated by con-
sumer groups. It would make the assignee subject to all claims and
defenses which the buyer or lessee may have against the seller or
lessor, notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary. 2 ' Under the
second alternative, favoring the creditor viewpoint, an agreement not
to assert such a claim or defense against the assignee would not be
enforceable unless the buyer or lessee gives the assignee written
notice of his claim or defense within three months after the assignee
has notified him in writing that the assignment has been made and
that he has three months within which to notify the assignee of any
such claim or defense. 2 ' Under either alternative, the claim of the
buyer or lessee is limited to the amount owing at the time it is
asserted and can only be asserted by way of set-off or defense to the
claim of the assignee.'22
C. Provisions Affecting Consumer Credit Sales Only
1. Cross collateral.-A seller may further secure his debt by taking
a security interest in other property in which the seller already has a
security interest by virtue of a prior sale.' 23 And the seller may like-
wise take a security interest in the property sold in the subsequent sale
as security for the previous debt.'24 But the rate of the credit service
charge may not exceed the rate that would be permitted if the
balances were consolidated. 2 ' Where such debts are either secured
by cross-collateral or consolidated, they are deemed paid and the
security interests are terminated under the first-in-first-out rule. 2 '
2. Referral sales.--Another consumer area which has been char-
acterized by substantial abuse is the referral sale. It is largely
eliminated under the Code. A seller or lessor may not offer to give
120 UCCC § 2.404 (Alternative A).
121 UCCC § 2.404 (Alternative B).
122 Supra notes 120 and 121.
123 UCCC § 2.408 (1).
124 Id.
125 UCCC § 2.408 (2).
126 UCCC § 2.409.
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a rebate, payment or other credit to the buyer or lessee as an
inducement for a sale or lease in exchange for the names of prospec-
tive purchasers or lessees or the like where the earning of such rebate,
payment or other credit is contingent upon the occurrence of an
event subsequent to the agreement.' 27 Any such agreement is un-
enforceable and the buyer or lessee may either rescind the agreement
or retain the goods delivered and services performed without paying
for them.'
3. Restrictions on deficiency judgments in consumer credit sales.
-Where the cash price of goods in which the seller has a security
interest does not exceed $1,000, the seller or his assignee may
repossess or accept surrender of the goods without obligation to
resell or he may proceed to judgment for the balance owing on the
sale. He cannot retake the goods and also obtain a deficiency
judgment. 29 However, the buyer may be held liable to the seller for
wrongfully damaging or withholding the collateral. 3 '
VII. DEBTORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
The debtor is granted the right to recover excess charges and in
addition certain penalties may be imposed upon the creditor if his vio-
lation of the Code is intentional. The debtor is also given a "buyer's
remorse" period in which to rescind home solicitation sales."' In
this situation, the Code attempts to free the buyer from the effects
of high pressure sales practices often associated with door to door
selling of products which at times are inferior in quality and which
often are overpriced. Similarly, the debtor is granted the right to res-
cind transactions creating a lien on his home. In either situation, the
creditor remains bound while awaiting the lapse of the three-day peri-
od which the debtor may use both to reconsider and to shop for bet-
ter terms.
A. In General
1. Debtor's right to rescind certain transactions affecting residence
real estate.-The Code adopts the provision of the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act 132 pursuant to which the debtor is given a
127 UCCC § 2.411.
128 Id.
129 UCCC § 5.103.
130 UCCC § 5.103 (5).
131 Sher, The "Cooling-Off' Period In Door to Door Sales, 15 UCLA L.
REv. 717 (1968).
132 Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 125, - Stat. -.
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three-day right to rescind a consumer credit sale or loan agreement
whereunder a security interest is retained or acquired in an interest
in land which is used or expected to be used as the debtor's resi-
dence.'3 3 This right continues for three days after either the consum-
mation of the transaction or the creditor's delivery to the debtor of
written notice of his three-day right to rescind, whichever is later.
This provision confers upon the debtor a cooling-off period somewhat
akin to that prescribed for home solicitation sales,'34 but it is broader
in the sense that it applies to loans as well as sales and is applicable
whether the transaction took place in the home or elsewhere and
whether or not accompanied by personal solicitation by the creditor.
However, it does not apply to the creation or retention of a first lien
against a dwelling to finance the acquisition of that dwelling, nor does
it apply to sales or loans by a non-professional creditor. Neither does
it apply to situation in which homeowners must meet bona fide per-
sonal financial emergencies, if the Administrator has prescribed rules
authorizing the extent and circumstances under which the debtor's
right to rescind may be modified or waived. Upon rescission, any
security interest given by the debtor is void. He is not liable for any
charges and the creditor must return to the debtor within ten days any
money or property given as earnest money, down payment or other-
wise. Upon such return, the debtor must tender to the creditor, either
at the site of the property or at the debtor's residence, any property
delivered by the creditor, or, if tender in kind would be impractical,
its reasonable value.' 3 If the creditor fails to take possession within
ten days after tender, ownership of all such property vests in the
debtor without any obligation to pay for it.
2. Home solicitation sales.-A somewhat similar three-day right
to rescind is given to the buyer with respect to a consumer credit sale
of goods or services, other than farm equipment, made by a seller who
personally solicits the sale at the buyer's residence and there obtains
the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase.'3 6 However, this right
133 UCCC § 5.204.
C4 U Cc §§ 2.501-2.505.
" In an effort to forestall home improvement contractors and the like
from proceeding with work on the debtor's premises prior to expiration of
the three-day period (in which case the contractor would frequently be entitled
to "reasonable value"), Proposed Regulation Z, Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (c) (Oct. 16, 1968, directs that the cre-
ditor shall not, among other things, "make any physical changes in the prop-
erty of the customer, or perform any work or service for the customer until
he has reasonably satisfied himself that the customer has not exercised his
right of rescission."
136 UCCC § 2.502.
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to rescind does not apply if the sale is made pursuant to prior nego-
tiations between the parties at a fixed business establishment where
goods or services are offered or exhibited for sale, nor does it apply
if the sale is made pursuant to a pre-existing revolving charge ac-
count.13 Neither does it apply where the seller, instead of financing
the sale, merely assists the buyer in obtaining a loan elsewhere." 8 As
with rescission of security interests in real estate, notice by the seller
to the buyer of the right to rescind is a prerejuisite to the running of
the three-day period. 39 So, too, is the requirement that upon rescis-
sion the seller restore to the buyer any payments or any note or the
like within ten days. 4' But here the seller may retain up to 5 percent
of the cash price as a cancellation fee, in no event exceeding the
amount of the cash down payment."4 Following rescission the buyer
upon demand must tender any goods delivered by the seller within
a reasonable time, but if the seller fails to make such demand within
a reasonable time, the goods become the property of the buyer with-
out obligation to pay for them. '42 For this purpose, the Code pre-
sumes forty days to be a reasonable time. 4' The seller loses the bene-
fit of any services performed prior to rescission. 44 Where the sale is
governed by both this provision and the one on rescission of secur-
ity interests in real estate, the buyer may elect to proceed under
either. 145
B. Violation
1. Violations other than disclosure violations.-The debtor is not
obligated to pay a charge in excess of that allowed under the Code
and he is entitled to refund, credit or recovery for any such charge
paid by him. The debtor is also accorded the following rights where
the creditor fails to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the
137 UCCC § 2.501.
1"8 By definition, a consumer credit sale is limited to one in which
"credit is granted by a seller who regularly engages as a seller in credit trans-
actions of the same kind," UCCC § 2.104 (a). Hence, the seller must provide
the credit in order to fall within the definition.
139 UCCC § 2.503. The notice here must be incorporated into the
written agreement or offer itself, except where the buyer requests the seller to
provide the goods or services without delay in an emergency. In the emer-
gency situation, the buyer cannot cancel after the seller makes a substantial
beginning of performance under the contract nor can he cancel as to goods if
the goods cannot be returned in substantially as good condition as when
received by the buyer. UCCC § 2.502 (5).
140 UCCC § 2.504 (1).
141 UCCC § 2.504 (3).
142 UCCC § 2.505 (1).
143 Id.
144 UCCC § 2.505 (3).
14sUCCC § 2.502 (6).
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following violations were unintentional or the result of a bonda fide
error:
(a) Where the creditor violates the provisions barring use of
of certain negotiable instruments or limiting the schedule of
payments or loan term for regulated loans (carrying rates over
10 percent), the debtor is not obligated to pay the credit
service or loan finance charge and he may recover a penalty
as determined by the court up to three times the amount of
such credit service or loan finance charge, together with rea-
sonable attorney's fees.
(b) Where the creditor violates the provision relating to au-
thority to make supervised loans (carrying rates over 18 per-
cent), the loan is void and the debtor may recover any part
of the principal or loan finance charge so made, together with
reasonable attorney's fees.
(c) Where the debtor is entitled to a refund and the creditor
refuses to make such refund within a reasonable time after de-
mand, the debtor may recover a penalty as determined by the
court up to the amount of the credit service or loan finance
charge or ten times the amount of the excess charge, whichever
is greater, together with reasonable attorney's fees. If the ex-
cess charge is found to have been made in deliberate violation or
reckless disregard of the provisions of the Code, this penalty
may be recovered even though the creditor has refunded the
excess charge. '46
Thus, while the Code prescribes substantial penalties to deter the
over-reaching creditor, it recognizes that violations are ordinarily
the result of unintentional errors which need not be dealt with se-
verely. The debtor must bring action for recovery under (a), (b)
and (c) above within two years after the violation with respect to
revolving accounts and within one year after the due date of the last
scheduled payment with respect to other agreements. But the debtor
may nevertheless use refunds or penalties by way of set-off against his
obligation at any time.'47 Recovery may be had from either the credi-
tor committing the violation or from any assignee who undertakes
direct collection of payments or enforcement of rights arising from
the debt.
146 UCCC § 5.202.
147 UCCC § 5.205.
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2. Disclosure violations.'4 -- For failure to disclose required in-
formation, the creditor is liable in an amount twice the credit ser-
vice or loan finance charge but in no event less than $100 nor
more than $1,000, together with reasonable attorney's fees. Action
must be brought within one year after the violation, but the debtor
may use the penalty by way of set-off against his obligation at any
time.' 9 Nevertheless, the creditor is not liable where he shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error. Nor is the credi-
tor liable where, within fifteen days after discovering an error and
prior to either suit or receipt of written notice of the error, he notifies
the debtor of the error and makes such adjustments in the account as
may be necessary to limit the credit service or loan finance charge to
the amount or percentage rate actually disclosed. The creditor is not
liable to the debtor for advertising violations-these being left for
injunctive action at the instance of the Administrator,"' together with
criminal sanctions for willful violations."' An assignee of the creditor
is only liable hereunder when a security interest in land is involved
and the assignee was engaged in a continuing business relationship
with the original creditor. Even then, the assignee can escape liability
if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence that he had no rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the original creditor was engaged in
violations of the Code and that he maintained procedures reasonably
adapted to apprise him of the existence of the violation.
VIII. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The Code recognizes that the remedies available to the debtor will
frequently be unknown to him or, even if known, will involve such
relatively small sums as to discourage private enforcement. Conse-
quently, the appropriate public official is given rather broad authority
designed both to thwart and to rectify breaches of the Code. He
is empowered to issue cease and desist orders against creditors
engaging in violations of the Code and his order becomes final if
the creditor fails to seek court review within thirty days." 2 Enforce-
ment of his order is to be had through the court.' 3 However, he
148 UCCC § 5.203.
149 UCCC § 5.205.
1s0 UCCC §§ 6.108, 6.111.
151 UCCC § 5.302.
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may not issue such an order with respect to unconscionable agree-
ments or fraudulent or unconscionable conduct; rather, the Admin-
istrator must institute a civil action for an injunction." 4 The Admin-
istrator is also authorized to bring actions on behalf a debtor or a
class of debtors to recover excess charges and penalties for failure
to make a refund within a reasonable time after demand and to
recover penalties for excess charges deliberately or recklessly made. '
The Code provides for extensive examining and investigatory pow-
ers over licensees making supervised loans and it permits the exercise
of such powers over regulated lenders as well."56 Investigatory author-
ity is likewise conferred with respect to any creditor where there exists
probable cause to believe that a person has engaged in an act subject
to administrative action under the Code. 1 7 However, the exercise of
cease and desist orders and investigatory powers by the Administrator
is limited to small loan companies and other non-banking lenders
with respect to loans and to merchants and sales finance companies
with respect to sales and leases." 8 On the other hand, the exercise
of all such powers as to banking and similar institutions is reposed in
the hands of the same governmental authority now supervising such
institutions."5 9 For example, national banks will continue to be su-
pervised by the Comptroller of the Currency.
The proponents of the Code recommend centralizing all powers of
administration in a single official or agency. 6 In West Virginia
this official would doubtless be the commissioner of banking. In ad-
dition, there would be created a Council of Advisors on Consumer
Credit consisting of sixteen members to be appointed by the gover-
nor, with fair representation from various segments of the consumer
credit industry and the public. 6 ' It would be the function of the
Council to advise and consult with the Administrator concerning the
exercise of his powers and to make recommendations to him to the
end that the objectives of the Code might be fully achieved. 62
IX. CONCLUSION
On balance, the Code has much to commend it. For consumer
credit sales, it imposes generous rate ceilings where none have exist-
154 UCCC §§ 6.108 (6), 6.111.
155 UCCC § 6.113.
156 UCCC § 3.506.
157 UCCC § 6.106.
158 UCCC §§ 3.506, 6.105.
159 Id.
160 UCCC § 6.103, comment.
161 UCC § 6.301.
162 UCC § 6.302.
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ed. For consumer loans it prescribes, for all lenders, rate maximums
that are largely comparable to those now available to a select group
of lenders who enjoy a monopoly with the high risk borrower. To
generalize, the Code rates are (1) comparable to existing small
loan rates on loans up to $800,' ' (2) greater than industrial loan
rates authorized on loans in the $800 to $3,500 class' 64 and (3) less
than industrial loan company rates permitted on loans substantially
in excess of $3,500.' 65 Moreover, the competitive forces to be un-
leashed by the Code's free entry approach, together with the require-
ment that rates be disclosed in understandable terms, will tend to
drive credit costs below the Code ceilings.
These rates, of course, do not take into account the increased
yields now available through tie-in sales of insurance. If adoption
of the Code were to be accompanied by effective regulation of credit
insurance costs to the end that the yield to the lender is in fact con-
fined to the rate which he advertises, high rate lenders would likely
abandon the sale of expensive credit accident and health policies and
would be compelled to offer credit life at genuinely competitive rates.
The savings to the borrower would, in turn, appreciably offset the
effect of higher Code rates in the $800 to $3,500 class.
The extensive protection which the Code affords to the con-
sumer will do much toward equalizing the marked disparity in bar-
gaining power and sophistication between the consumer and his sell-
er, lender or lessor. These safeguards alone have earned the endorse-
ment of the entire Code by the Special Assistant to the President for
163 At $800, the composite rate for a supervised loan repayable in a single
installment is 26.67% under the Code as compared to 25.5% under the West
Virginia Small Loans Act, W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 7A, § 13 (Michie 1966).
Of course, small loans are ordinarily repayable in equal monthly installments
over periods of one to two years or longer, in which case the composite rate is
greater under both the Code and the Small Loans Act. See note 38, supra.
164 Consumer loans in the $800 to $3,500 class are typically repayable
in one, two or three years, in which case the industrial loan rate would average
slightly in excess of 20%. The Code rates, however, would run several per-
centage points higher on the smaller loans in this class, narrowing to the
equivalent of the industrial loan rate at about $3,500. Compare note 38, supra.
On the other hand, schedules of indebtedness filed in consumer bankruptcy
cases in the Southern District of West Virginia disclose that it is not at all un-
common for the same borrower to be indebted simultaneously to two or even
three small loan companies on separate $800 loans, in which case the composite
rate on all such loans combined is substantially greater than would be the
rate for a single $1,600 or $2,400 loan under the Code.
16- On consumer loans of this size, the loan terms tend to extend beyond
three years in order that the monthly repayment is low enough to be manage-
able. As the loan term lengthens beyond three years, the maximum permis-
sible rate under the Code levels to 18%, whereas the true annual rate for in-
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Consumer Affairs and by the President's Consumer Advisory Coun-
cil.
16 6
Nevertheless, it must be observed that there is no demonstrable
urgency necessitating immediate enactment of the whole Code. It is
true that enforcement of disclosure will rest at the federal level com-
mencing July 1, 1969, in the absence of substantially similar state
legislation. Yet, any concern over federal regulation can readily be
met by adoption of a truth in lending act patterned after the Code's
provisions relating to disclosure.
The economic and social implications of the Code ought to be care-
fully weighed before the question of its adoption is passed upon. To
be sure the architects of the Code have given painstaking considera-
tion to the Code's economic and social impact. Yet, this is hardly
reason to discourage a thoughtful, second look at legislation of this
magnitude. Indeed, it is quite likely that all aspects of the Code will
be subjected to extensive study and fruitful analysis by many state
legislative bodies over the nation, particularly those of the more popu-
lous states. The full benefit of these efforts ought to be on hand be-
fore final judgment is made.
166 President's Consumer Advisory Council, Resolution Endorsing the
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